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Abstract
Given a class C of models, a binary relation R between models,
and a model-theoretic language L, we consider the modal logic and
the modal algebra of the theory of C in L where the modal opera-
tor is interpreted via R. We discuss how modal theories of C and R
depend on the model-theoretic language, their Kripke completeness,
and expressibility of the modality inside L. We calculate such theories
for the submodel and the quotient relations. We prove a downward
Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem for first-order language expanded with
the modal operator for the extension relation between models.
Keywords: modal logic, modal algebra, robust modal theory, logic of
submodels, logic of quotients, logic of forcing, provability logic, model-
theoretic logic
Introduction
We consider modal systems in which the modal operator is interpreted via
a binary relation on a class of models. Many instances of such systems
can be found in the literature. During the last years, modal logics of var-
ious relations between models of set theory have been studied, see, e.g.,
[15, 18, 7, 17, 21]. A well established area in provability logic deals with
modal axiomatizations of relations between models of arithmetic (and be-
tween arithmetic theories), see, e.g., [27, 5, 20, 34, 35, 19, 16]. In another ex-
tensively studied area modalities are interpreted by relations between Kripke
and temporal models, see, e.g., [33, 11, 4] or the monograph [32]. In [3], the
consequence along an abstract relation between models is studied, which is
closely related to our consideration.
∗The work on this paper was supported by the Russian Science Foundation under
grant 16-11-10252 and carried out at Steklov Mathematical Institute of Russian Academy
of Sciences.
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Let f be a unary operation on sentences of a model-theoretic language
L, and T a set of sentences of L (e.g., the set of theorems in a given cal-
culus, or the set of sentences valid in a given class of models). Using the
propositional modal language, one can consider the following “fragment”
of T : variables are evaluated by sentences of L, and f interprets the modal
operator; the modal theory of f on T , or just the f -fragment of T , is defined
as the set of those modal formulas which are in T under every valuation.
A well-known example of this approach is a complete modal axiomatization
of formal provability in Peano arithmetic given by Solovay [31]. Another
important example is the theorem by Hamkins and Lo¨we axiomatizing the
modal logic of forcing (introduced earlier by Hamkins in [15]) where the
modal operator expresses satisfiability in forcing extensions [18]. Both these
modal systems have good semantic and algorithmic properties; in particular,
they have the finite model property, are finitely axiomatizable, and hence
decidable.
These examples inspire the following observation. Let C be an arbitrary
class of models of the same signature, T = ThL(C) the theory of C in a model-
theoretic language L, and R a binary relation on C. Assuming that the
satisfiability in R-images of models in C can be expressed by an operation
f on sentences of L, i.e., for every sentence ϕ of L, and every A ∈ C,
A  f(ϕ) (“ϕ is possible at A”) iff B  ϕ for some B with
ARB,
we can define the modal theory of R in L as the f -fragment of T . In the
general frame semantics, this modal theory is characterized by an enormous
structure (C,R, Cϕ : ϕ is a sentence of L) where Cϕ is the class of models in C
validating ϕ. We can also define the modal Lindenbaum algebra of ThL(C)
and R, i.e., the Boolean algebra of sentences of L modulo the equivalence
on C, endowed with the modal operator induced by f .1 In Section 2, we
provide formal definitions and basic semantic tools for such modal theories.
In particular, the algebra of ThL(C) and R can be represented as the modal
algebra of a general frame consisting of complete theories {ThL(A) : A ∈ C}.
We use this in Section 3, where we calculate modal logics of the submodel
relation ⊒; to express the satisfiability in submodels, we use second-order
language.
In Section 4,2 we discuss the situation when the R-satisfiability is not
expressible in a language K (for example, this situation is typical when K is
first-order). In this case the modal algebra of ThK(C) can be defined as the
subalgebra of the modal algebra of ThL(C) generated by the sentences of K,
1Modal algebras of theories are broadly used in provability logic, where they are called
Magari (or diagonizable) algebras; they are known to keep a lot of information about
theories containing arithmetic (see, e.g., [28]).
2A significant part of Sections 4 and 5 was motivated by reviewers’ questions on an
earlier version of this paper.
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for any L stronger than K where the R-satisfiability on C is expressible: the
resulting modal algebra (and hence, its modal logic) does not depend on
the way how we extend the language K. Under a natural assumption on C
and R, such an L can always by constructed, and hence, the modal algebra
of ThK(C) and R is well-defined for arbitrary K (however, the resulting
modal logic is not necessarily a “fragment” of the theory ThK(C) anymore).
Then we consider the finitary first-order language expanded with the modal
operator for the extension relation ⊑ and prove a version of the downward
Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem for this language.
In general, modal theories of R depend on the model-theoretic language
we consider. We say that a modal theory of R is robust iff making the lan-
guage stronger does not alter this theory (intuitively, the robust theory can
be considered as the “true” modal logic of the model-theoretic relation R).
We discuss this notion in Section 5. In Theorem 29, we show that under
a certain assumption on C and R, the robust logic is Kripke complete. Then
we use this theorem to describe robust theories of the quotient and the
submodel relations on certain natural classes.
A preliminary report on some results in Sections 2 and 3 can be found
in [26].
1 Preliminaries
To simplify reading, as a rule we denote the syntax of our object lan-
guages differently: we use inclined letters if they are related to model theory
(x, y, . . . for individual variables, ϕ,ψ, . . . for formulas), and upright letters if
they are related to modal logic (p, q, . . . for propositional variables, ϕ,ψ, . . .
for formulas).
Model-theoretic languages The languages we use for model theory are
model-theoretic languages in sense of [2] (where they are called “model-
theoretic logics”). We are pointing out here only two of their features,
which will be essential for the further investigations: if L is a model-theoretic
language under our consideration, then:
(i) Satisfiability in L is preserved under isomorphisms;
(ii) L includes Lω,ω, the standard first-order language with usual finitary
connectives and quantifiers.
Also, we assume that L is a set unless otherwise specified. For a model A,
ThL(A), or just Th(A), denotes its theory in L, i.e., the set of all sentences
of L holding in A; likewise for a class of models.
3
Modal logic By a modal logic we shall mean a normal propositional uni-
modal logic (see, e.g., [6] or [9]). Modal formulas are built from a countable
set PV of propositional variables p, q, . . . , the Boolean connectives, and the
modal connectives ✸, ✷. We assume that ⊥,→, ✸ are basic, and others are
abbreviations; in particular, ✷ abbreviates ¬✸¬ . Let MF denote the set
of modal formulas. A set of modal formulas is called a normal modal logic
iff it contains all classical tautologies, two following modal axioms:
¬✸⊥ and ✸(p ∨ q)→ ✸p ∨✸q,
and is closed under three following rules of inference:
Modus Ponens
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
, Substitution
ϕ(p)
ϕ(ψ)
, Monotonicity
ϕ→ ψ
✸ϕ→ ✸ψ
.
A general frame F is a triple (W,R,V) where W is a nonempty set,
R ⊆ W ×W , and V is a subalgebra of the powerset algebra P(W ) closed
under R−1 (i.e., such that R−1(A) = {x ∈ W : ∃y ∈ A xRy} is in V when-
ever A is in V). By a Kripke frame (W,R) we mean (W,R,P(W )). We shall
often use the term frame for a general frame (and never for a Kripke frame).
A modal algebra is a Boolean algebra endowed with a unary operation that
distributes w.r.t. finite disjunctions. The modal algebra of a frame (W,R,V)
is (V, R−1).
A Kripke model M on a frame F = (W,R,V) is a pair (F, θ) where
θ : PV → V is a valuation. The truth relation M, x  ϕ (“ϕ is true
at x in M”) is defined in the standard way (see, e.g., [9]); in particular,
M, x  ✸ϕ iff M, y  ϕ for some y with xRy. A formula ϕ ∈ MF is true in
a model M iff it is true at every x in M, and ϕ is valid in a frame F iff it is
true in every model on F. A modal formula ϕ is valid in a modal algebra A
iff ϕ = ⊤ holds in A. In particular, it follows that if A is the modal algebra
of a frame F, then ϕ is valid in A iff ϕ is valid in F. The set MLog(F) of
all valid in F formulas is called the (modal) logic of the frame F; likewise
for algebras. It is well-known (see, e.g., [6] or [9]) that a set of formulas is
a consistent normal logic iff it is the logic of a general frame iff it is the logic
of a non-trivial modal algebra.
In our paper we also consider modal logics of general frames (C,R,V)
with a proper class C; see Remarks 1 and 3 in the next section.
S4 is the smallest logic containing the formulas ✸✸p→ ✸p and p→ ✸p,
S4.2 is S4 +✸✷p→ ✷✸p, and S4.2.1 is S4 + ✷✸p↔ ✸✷p, where Λ +ϕ is
the smallest logic that includes Λ ∪ {ϕ}.
2 Modal theories of model-theoretic relations
Definitions Fix a signature Ω and a language L = L(Ω) based on Ω. Let
Ls be the set of all sentences of L.
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Consider a unary operation f on sentences of L. A (propositional) valu-
ation in L is a map from PV to Ls. A valuation ‖·‖ extends to the set MF
of modal formulas as follows:
‖⊥‖ = ⊥,
‖ϕ→ ψ‖ = ‖ϕ‖ → ‖ψ‖,
‖✸ϕ‖ = f(‖ϕ‖).
Given a set of sentences T ⊆ Ls, we define the modal theory of f on T
MTh(T, f) as the set of modal formulas ϕ such that for every valuation ‖·‖
in L, ‖ϕ‖ is in T . Thus, modal formulas can be viewed as axiom schemas
(for sentences) and we can think of the modal theory of f on T as a fragment
of T .
Example 1. Let L be the usual first-order finitary language Lω,ω.
1. Let Ω be the signature of arithmetic and f(ϕ) express the consistency
of a sentence ϕ in Peano arithmetic PA. By the well-known Solovay’s re-
sults [31], the modal theory of f on PA is the Go¨del–Lo¨b logic GL, and the
modal theory of f on the true arithmetic TA, the set of all sentences that
are true in the standard model of arithmetic, is the (quasi-normal but not
normal) Solovay logic S. A survey on provability logics can be found in [1].
2. Let Ω be the signature of set theory (i.e., Ω = {∈}) and f(ϕ) express
that ϕ holds in a generic extension. By Hamkins and Lo¨we [18], the modal
theory of f on ZFC is S4.2.
In our work, we are interested in the case when T is the theory of some
class C of models of Ω. An easy observation shows that in this case the
modal theory is closed under the rules of Modus Ponens and Substitution.
Notice that it is not necessarily closed under Monotonicity, as the instance
of the Solovay logic S shows.3 However, as we shall see, the modal theory is
a normal logic whenever f expresses the satisfiability in images of a binary
relation between models.
Definition 1. Let R be a binary relation on C (or, perhaps, on a larger
class C′ ⊇ C). The R-satisfiability on C is expressible in L iff there exists
f : Ls → Ls such that for every sentence ϕ ∈ Ls and every model A ∈ C,
A  f(ϕ) ⇔ ∃B ∈ C (ARB & B  ϕ).
Some examples of such expressibility and non-expressibility will be given
below.
The following is straightforward:
3Let us also mention the logic of pure provability introduced by Buss in [8], which is
not closed under the rule of substitution.
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Proposition 1. If f and f ′ both express the R-satisfiability on C, and T =
Th(C), then MTh(T, f) = MTh(T, f ′).
Thus, in this case, MTh(T, f) does not depend on the choice of f .
Definition 2. Let the R-satisfiability be expressible in L on a class C of
models. The modal theory of (C,R) in L, denoted by MThL(C,R), is the
set of modal formulas ϕ such that C  ‖ϕ‖ for every propositional valuation
in L.
In this section, we just write MTh(C,R) assuming L is fixed.
Given a propositional valuation ‖·‖ in L, consider M = (C,R, θ), the
enormous “Kripke model” with θ(p) = {A ∈ C : A  ‖p‖}. By a straightfor-
ward induction on a modal formula ϕ, for every A in C
A  ‖ϕ‖ ⇔ M,A  ϕ,
where  on the left-hand and on the right-hand side of the equivalence
denotes the satisfiability relation in model theory and the truth relation of
a modal formula in a Kripke model, respectively. It follows that
C  ‖ϕ‖ ⇔ M,A  ϕ for all A ∈ C.
Let Mod(ψ) be the class of models of ψ ∈ Ls, and Cψ = Mod(ψ) ∩ C. Then
validity of ‖ϕ‖ in C for all propositional valuations in L can be considered as
validity of the modal formula ϕ in an enormous “general frame of models”
(C,R,V) where V “consists” of Cψ with ψ ∈ Ls.
Remark 1. The collection V looks like a “class of classes”. In fact, however,
V is a usual class defined by a formula of set theory with two parameters: if
C, Ls are defined by formulas Φ, Φ
′, respectively, then what we understand
by V is the class of pairs (A, ψ) defined by a formula Υ that is constructed
from Φ, Φ′ and expresses the satisfaction relation between models in C and
sentences in Ls. Thus subclasses Cψ of C playing the role of “elements” of V
are in fact defined by Υ with a fixed second argument ψ. This allows us to
formally extend the definition of validity in a (set) frame to the case of the
“frame of models” (C,R,V).
It follows that the modal logic MLog(C,R,V), i.e., the set of all modal
formulas that are valid in (C,R,V), coincides with the modal theory of (C,R)
in L. Namely, we have
Theorem 2. If the R-satisfiability on C is expressible in L, then
MTh(C,R) = MLog(C,R,V). (1)
Consequently, MTh(C,R) is a normal logic.
Proposition 3. Assume that f expresses the R-satisfiability on C in L.
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1. If D ⊆ C is R-upward closed (i.e., A ∈ D & ARB & B ∈ C implies
B ∈ D), then the R-satisfiability on D is expressible in L by f .
2. If ψ is a sentence of L, then the R-satisfiability on C ∩ Mod(ψ) is
expressible in L by g : ϕ 7→ f(ϕ ∧ ψ).
Let R∗(A) denote
⋃
n<ωR
n(A), the least R-closed D ⊆ C containing A.
From (1) and the generated subframe construction (see, e.g., [9, Section
8.5]), we obtain
Corollary 4. If the R-satisfiability on C is expressible in L, then
MTh(C,R) =
⋂
A∈C
MTh(R∗(A),R).
Frames of theories Assume that the R-satisfiability is expressible on C
in L by some f : Ls → Ls.
We have observed in Theorem 2 that MTh(C,R) can be viewed as the
modal logic of a general frame of models. Now we provide other semantic
characterizations of MTh(C,R).
Put T = {Th(A) : A ∈ C}. Note that T is a set since L is assumed to
be a set. For theories T1, T2 ∈ T , let
T1RT T2 iff ∃A1,A2 ∈ C (A1  T1 & A2  T2 & A1RA2),
T1R
⋄
T T2 iff ∀ϕ ∈ T2 f(ϕ) ∈ T1.
Observe that R⋄T does not depend on the choice of f , and RT ⊆ R
⋄
T .
For ϕ ∈ Ls, put Tϕ = {T ∈ T : ϕ ∈ T}. Clearly, Tϕ∧ψ = Tϕ ∩ Tψ and
T¬ϕ = T \ Tϕ. Consider an arbitrary binary relation R such that
RT ⊆ R ⊆ R
⋄
T .
It follows from the definitions that R
−1
(Tϕ) = Tf(ϕ). Therefore,
A = {Tϕ : ϕ ∈ Ls}
is a subalgebra of the powerset algebra P(T ) closed under R
−1
, and
(T ,R,A) is a general frame. We call (T ,RT ,A) and (T ,R
⋄
T ,A) the mini-
mal and the maximal frames of theories for C,R, and L.
Remark 2. The relation R can be viewed as a filtration of R (see, e.g., [14,
Section 4]). The frame (T ,R⋄T ,A) is known as the refinement of (C,R,V)
(cf. [9, Chapter 8]).
For sentences ϕ,ψ, put ϕ ≈ ψ iff C  ϕ ↔ ψ. Let L/≈ be the Linden-
baum algebra of the theory Th(C), i.e., the set Ls of sentences of Lmodulo ≈
with operations induced by Boolean connectives. We have f(ϕ) ≈ f(ψ)
whenever ϕ ≈ ψ, hence, f induces the operation f≈ on L/≈. It is easy to
see that (L/≈, f≈) is a modal algebra. It is called the modal (Lindenbaum)
algebra of the language L on (C,R).
The above arguments yield
7
Theorem 5. If RT ⊆ R ⊆ R
⋄
T , then the modal algebras (L/≈, f≈) and
(A,R
−1
) are isomorphic.
Proof. The isomorphism takes the ≈-class of a sentence ϕ to Tϕ.
Theorem 6. Assume that the R-satisfiability on C is expressible in L. Let
RT ⊆ R ⊆ R
⋄
T . Then
MTh(C,R) = MLog(T ,R,A) = MLog(L/≈, f≈).
Proof. Every valuation ‖·‖ in L can be viewed as a valuation θ in the frame
F = (T ,R,A), and vice versa. By induction on ϕ, for every A in C we have
A  ‖ϕ‖ iff (F, θ),Th(A)  ϕ. Thus MTh(C,R) = MLog(T ,R,A).
The second equality immediately follows from Theorem 5.
Corollary 7. If T is finite, then MTh(C,R) is the logic of the Kripke frame
(T ,RT ).
Proof. In this case A = P(T ).
The family T of complete theories can be viewed as the quotient of C
by the L-equivalence ≡ where A ≡ B iff Th(A) = Th(B). Theorem 6
can be generalized for the case of any equivalence ∼ on C finer than ≡ ; in
particular, it holds for the isomorphism equivalence ≃ on models, or for the
equivalence in a stronger model-theoretic language. Namely, we let:
[A]∼R∼[B]∼ ⇔ ∃A
′ ∼ A ∃B′ ∼ B A′RB′,
[A]∼R
⋄
∼[B]∼ ⇔ ∀ϕ ∈ Ls (B  ϕ ⇒ A  f(ϕ));
the algebra of valuations is defined as the collection V∼ “consisting” of
classes Cψ/∼ for ψ ∈ Ls. (Again, since [A]∼ are in general proper classes,
V∼ looks like a “class of classes of classes” but actually is nothing but a three-
parameter formula; cf. Remarks 1 and 3.) As in the proof of Theorem 6, for
R∼ ⊆ R ⊆ R
⋄
∼ one can obtain that
MTh(C,R) = MLog(C/∼,R,V∼). (2)
To the best of our knowledge, Theorem 6 (or its analogue (2)) has never
been formulated explicitly before, although similar constructions related to
frames of arithmetic theories were considered earlier (V.Yu. Shavrukov, an
unpublished note, 2013; [19, Remark 3]).
We conclude this section with a continuation of Remark 1.
Remark 3. It is possible to give a general definition of frames that are classes
and their logics (in our metatheory which is assumed to be ZFC where
“classes” are shorthands for formulas). We outline the idea and postpone
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details for a further paper. Below capital Greek letters Φ, Ψ, . . . denote
formulas of the metatheory.
Assume that C, L, R are (arbitrary) classes defined by formulas Φ, Φ′,
Ψ , respectively: C = {x : Φ(x)}, L = {y : Φ′(y)}, and R = {(x, v) : Ψ(x, v)}.
Let us say that a class V forms a class modal algebra (admissible for C, L,R)
iff it is defined by a formula Υ that fulfills the conditions expressing that
classes Cy = {x : Υ (x, y)} indexed by y in L play the role of “elements”
of V. Namely, Υ implies that all Cy are subclasses of C and their collection
is closed under Boolean operations and the modal operator given by R; e.g.,
the latter is expressed as follows:
∀y ∃z ∀x (Υ (x, z) & Φ′(y) ⇔ Φ(x) & ∃v (Ψ(x, v) & Υ (v, y))).
Further, let us say that θ is a valuation of propositional variables in V
iff θ is a (set) function with dom(θ) = PV and ran(θ) ⊆ L, and that F =
(C,R,V) is a class general frame and M = (C,R,V, θ) a class Kripke model
on F. To define the truth of modal formulas ϕ at a point x ∈ C in the
model M, denoted by M, x  ϕ, we first extend θ to a suitable θ¯ with
dom(θ¯) = MF and ran(θ) ⊆ L. It can be shown that such an extension
exists and is unique up to the equivalence ∼ on L defined by letting y ∼ z
iff ∀x (Υ (x, y)⇔ Υ (x, z)). Then we let
M, x  ϕ ⇔ Υ (x, θ¯(ϕ)).
This notion of truth has the expected properties; e.g., we have
M, x  ✸ϕ ⇔ ∃v (Ψ(x, v) &M, v  ϕ).
A formula ϕ ∈ MF is true in M iff ∀x (Φ(x) ⇒ M, x  ϕ), and valid in F
iff it is true in all models M on F. The modal logic MLog(F) of the class
frame F consists of those ϕ ∈ MF that are valid in F. It can be verified that
this logic is a set defined by a ZFC-formula constructed from the formulas
Φ,Φ′, Ψ, Υ , and it is normal.
By using formulas with additional parameters, one can imitate higher
order class algebras and their modal logics.
3 Logics of submodels
In this part, we apply Theorem 6 to calculate the modal theory of the
submodel relation on the class of all models of a given signature.
Expressing the satisfiability Given models A and B of a signature Ω,
let A ⊒ B mean “A contains B as a submodel”. As the initial step, we find
a model-theoretic language for expressing the ⊒-satisfiability. Observe first
that first-order languages are generally too weak for this.
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Proposition 8. If Ω contains a predicate symbol of arity ≥ 2, then the
⊒-satisfiability is not expressible in Lω,ω and moreover, in the infinitary
language L∞,ω.
Proof. We can suppose w.l.g. that Ω contains a binary predicate symbol <
(otherwise mimic it by a predicate symbol of a bigger arity by fixing other
arguments). Toward a contradiction, assume that some f mapping the class
of L∞,ω-sentences into itself expresses the ⊒-satisfiability. Let ϕ be an obvi-
ous Lω,ω-sentence saying that there exists a <-minimal element, and let ψ be
the sentence ¬ f(¬ϕ). Then ψ says that each submodel has a <-minimal
element (thus whenever Ω has no functional symbols then ψ says that < is
well-founded). Let κ be such that ψ ∈ Lκ,ω. It follows from Karp’s the-
orem (see, e.g., [24, Theorem 14.29]) that there are models A0 and B0 of
Ω0 = {<} such that A0 is isomorphic to an ordinal while B0 is not, and
A0 ≡Lκ,ω B0. Add a <-last element to each of the models A0 and B0 and
check that the resulting models A1 and B1 remain Lκ,ω-equivalent (e.g., by
using [24, Lemma 14.24]).
Expand A1 andB1 to models A andB of Ω, respectively, by interpreting
each predicate symbol other than< by the empty set, each functional symbol
of positive arity by the projection onto the first argument, and each constant
symbol by the <-last element of the model. It is easy to see that in both
A and B any formula of Ω is equivalent to a formula of Ω0; so we still
have A ≡Lκ,ω B. On the other hand, in both models every subset forms
a submodel whenever it contains the <-last element of the whole model,
whence it easily follows that A  ψ and B  ¬ψ. A contradiction.
However, second-order language suffices to express the ⊒-satisfiability
by the relativization argument (see, e.g., [36, p. 242]). Given a second-order
formula ϕ and a unary predicate variable U that does not occur in ϕ, let
ϕU be the relativization of ϕ to U defined in the standard way; in particular,
if P and F are second-order predicate functional variables of arity n, then
(∃P ϕ)U is ∃P
(
∀x0 . . . ∀xn−1
(
P (x0, . . . , xn−1)→
∧
i<n U(xi)
)
∧ ϕU
)
,
(∃F ϕ)U is ∃F
(
∀x0 . . . ∀xn−1
(∧
i<n U(xi) → U(F (x0, . . . , xn−1))
)
∧
ϕU
)
.
Let ψ(U) be the formula expressing that U is a submodel, i.e., saying that
the interpretation of U is non-empty and is closed under interpretations of
functional symbols in Ω. Then the map ϕ 7→ ∃U(ψ(U) ∧ ϕU ) expresses the
⊒-satisfiability on the class of all models of Ω. In view of Proposition 3, we
obtain:
Proposition 9. Let κ = |{F ∈ Ω : F is a functional symbol}|.
1. Let C be a class of models of Ω closed under submodels. Then the
⊒-satisfiability is expressible on C in L2λ,ω whenever λ > κ and λ ≥ ω.
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2. Let T be a set of sentences of L2µ,ω of Ω. Then the ⊒-satisfiability is
expressible on the class Mod(T ) in L2λ,ω whenever λ > max(κ, |T |) and
λ ≥ µ.
Remark 4. These results on expressibility can be refined in several directions.
In particular, the first statement of Proposition 9 remains true for monadic
language L2λ,ω; the assumption λ > κ is necessary; for details and further
results, see [25].
Axiomatization Henceforth in this section we assume that L expresses
the ⊒-satisfiability on the class of models under consideration.
The next easy result is soundness for modal theories of the submodel
relation.
Theorem 10. Let C be a class of Ω-models closed under submodels. Then
MThL(C,⊒) is a normal modal logic including S4. If moreover, Ω contains
a constant symbol, then MThL(C,⊒) includes S4.2.1.
Proof. Let A ∈ C, ‖·‖ a valuation in L. Trivially, A  ‖✸✸p → ✸p‖
and A  ‖p → ✸p‖. If Ω contains a constant symbol, consider the sub-
model B of A generated by constants. It is straightforward that in this case
A  ‖✷✸p‖ iff B  ‖✸p‖ iff B  ‖✷p‖ iff A  ‖✸✷p‖.
We are going to prove completeness. Let Qn be the lexicographic product
of (n<n,⊆) (an n-ramified tree of height n) and (n, n×n) (a cluster of size n).
Thus for s, t ∈ n<n and i, j ∈ n, in Qn we have
(s, i) ≤ (t, j) ⇔ s ⊆ t,
so Qn is a pre-tree which is n-ramified, has height n and clusters of size n at
each point. Let also Q′n be the ordered sum of Qn and a reflexive singleton,
thus Q′n adds to Qn an extra top element. The following fact is standard
(see, e.g., [9, p. 563]).
Proposition 11. Let ϕ be a modal formula. If ϕ /∈ S4, then ϕ is not valid
in Qn for some n > 0. If ϕ /∈ S4.2.1, then ϕ is not valid in Q
′
n for some
n > 0.
Let ≡ be the L-equivalence. For a model A, let Sub(A) be the set of all
its submodels, Sub(A)≡ abbreviate Sub(A)/≡.
Theorem 12. Let Ω have a functional symbol of arity ≥ 2. For every
positive n < ω, there exists a model An of Ω such that
(
Sub(An)≡,⊒≡
)
is isomorphic to
{
Qn if Ω has no constant symbols,
Q′n otherwise.
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Proof. First, suppose that Ω has no constant symbols.
Without loss of generality we may assume that Ω has a binary functional
symbol; we write · for it.
Fix n ≥ 1. Let Xn = n
<n × ω. We define the model An = (Xn, · , . . . )
of Ω as follows. Let E be any injective map from n<n into ω. For s, t ∈ n<n
and i, j ∈ ω, we put
(s, i) · (t, j) =


(s, i+ 1) if s = t, i = j,
(sa(i mod n), j) if s = t, j < i, |s| < n− 1,
(s, j + E(s)) if s = t, j = i+ 1, i ≡n0,
(inf{s, t}, inf{i, j}) otherwise,
where a denotes the concatenation, |s| the length of s, mod the remainder,
and ≡n the congruence modulo n. For other operations F in An we put
F ((s, i), . . .) = (s, i) and take the relations in An to be empty.
For (s, i) ∈ Xn let Xn(s, i) = {(t, j) ∈ Xn : (s, i)  (t, j)}, where we let
(s, i)  (t, j) iff s ⊆ t and i ≤ j.
Lemma 13. An X ⊆ Xn is the universe of a submodel of An iff X =
Xn(s, i) for some (s, i) ∈ Xn.
Proof. Straightforward from the definition of An.
Let An(s, i) be the submodel of An with the universe Xn(s, i).
Lemma 14. Let (s, i), (s, j) ∈ Xn. If i ≡n j, then the models An(s, i) and
An(s, j) are isomorphic.
Proof. The map (t, l) 7→ (t, l + n) is an isomorphism between An(s, i) and
An(s, i+ n).
We define p0(x) as x, and pk+1(x) as (pk(x)) · (pk(x)). Then for k < ω
An  (t, j) = p
k(s, i) iff s = t and j = i+ k.
For s ∈ n<n, let ϕs(x) be the following one-parameter formula:
x · p(x) = pE(s)+1(x).
Lemma 15. Let A be a submodel of An and (t, i) an element of A. Then
A  ϕs(t, i) iff s = t and i ≡n0.
Proof. We have p(t, i) = (t, i + 1). By the definition, (t, i) · (t, i + 1) =
(t, i+ E(t) + 1) if i ≡n 0, and (t, i) · (t, i + 1) = (t, i) otherwise.
Lemma 16. Let A be a submodel of An. For every s ∈ n
<n, we have:
A  ∃xϕs(x) iff (s, i) is in A for some i ∈ ω.
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Proof. The ‘only if’ part is immediate from Lemma 15. For the ‘if’ part we
use Lemmas 15 and 13.
For S ⊆ n<n, let χS be the sentence
∧
s∈S ∃xϕs(x) ∧
∧
s/∈S ¬∃xϕs(x),
and let χ≥s be χS for S = {t ∈ n
<n : s ⊆ t}.
Lemma 17. Let A be a submodel of An. Then A  χ≥s iff A = An(s, i) for
some i ∈ ω.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 16 and 13.
Let ψ(x) be the formula ¬∃y (x = p(y)). Then
An(s, i)  ψ(t, j) iff j = i.
For s ∈ n<n and k < n, let χs,k be the following sentence:
∃x
(
ϕs(p
n−k(x)) ∧ ψ(x)
)
∧ χ≥s.
Lemma 18. For every submodel A of An and every k < n, we have A  χs,k
iff A = An(s, i) for some i such that i ≡n k.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 17 and 15.
Lemma 19. Let A,B be submodels of An. The following are equivalent:
(i) A and B are isomorphic,
(ii) A and B are L-equivalent,
(iii) A and B are elementarily equivalent, i.e., Lω,ω-equivalent,
(iv) A = An(s, i) and B = An(s, j) for some s ∈ n
<n and i, j < ω such
that i ≡n j.
Proof. The implications (i)⇒ (ii) and (ii)⇒ (iii) are immediate from our
basic assumptions on model-theoretic languages. The crucial step (iii)⇒ (iv)
follows from Lemmas 13 and 18. Finally, (iv)⇒ (i) holds by Lemma 14.
From Lemma 13 we conclude that (Sub(An),⊒) is isomorphic to (Xn,).
Now it follows that (Sub(An)≡,⊒≡) is isomorphic to Qn, as required.
For the case when Ω has constant symbols, we add a new element c toXn
and define the model A′n on the set Xn ∪ {c}. We extend the above defined
operation · by letting c · x = x · c = c for all x; all constant symbols in Ω are
interpreted by c. The same arguments as above prove that (Sub(A′n)≡,⊒≡)
is isomorphic to Q′n.
This completes the proof of Theorem 12.
Now the completeness result follows:
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Theorem 20. Let Ω contain a functional symbol of arity ≥ 2, and let C be
the class of all models of Ω. Then
MThL(C,⊒) =
{
S4 if Ω has no constant symbols,
S4.2.1 otherwise.
Proof. We have soundness by Theorem 10. On the other hand, if A ∈ C, then
MThL(C,⊒) is contained in the logic of the Kripke frame (Sub(A)≡,⊒≡) by
Corollaries 4 and 7. Now completeness follows from Theorem 12.
Notice that the binary operation used in the proof of Theorem 12 is
not associative. Modal axiomatizations of ⊒ in second-order language on
semigroups, monoids, and groups are open questions.
Recall that Theorem 20 was formulated under the assumption that L ex-
presses the ⊒-satisfiability. In the next section we discuss how to define
modal theories without such requirements. The logics calculated in The-
orem 20 do not depend on L, while in general, modal theories depend on
a chosen model-theoretic language; we shall discuss this in Section 5.
4 Inexpressible modalities
In this section, we discuss the situation when the R-satisfiability is not
expressible in a model-theoretic language.
Definition The following question was raised by one of the reviewers on
an earlier version of the paper: what is the modal theory of (C,R) if the
R-satisfiability on C is not expressible in a given language? In particular,
what is the modal theory of the relation ⊒ in the first-order case? Another
natural question concerns the definition of modal theories in the case of ⊑.
Assume that L is a language stronger than K, and the R-satisfiability
on C is expressible in L. In this case, MThK(C,R) can be naturally defined
as the logic of the subalgebra of the modal algebra of L on (C,R) generated
by the sentences of K. Let us provide details.
First, we define an interim notion MThL[K](C,R). By Theorem 6,
MThL(C,R) is the logic of the Lindenbaum modal algebra A(L) =
(L/≈, fL≈). Let A(L[K]) be the subalgebra of A(L) generated by the sen-
tences of K (more formally, A(L[K]) is generated by the set {[ϕ]L≈ : ϕ ∈ Ks},
where [ϕ]L≈ = {ψ ∈ Ls : C  ϕ ↔ ψ}). Define MTh
L[K](C,R) as the modal
logic of A(L[K]). (Formally, we have defined MThL[K](C,R) for the case
K ⊆ L, but the same construction works for the case when K is weaker
than L in C, i.e., if every K-definable subclass of C is definable in L.)
It is immediate that MThL[K](C,R) is a normal logic, which in-
cludes MThL(C,R). Another simple (but important) observation is that
MThL[K](C,R) does not depend on the choice of L. Indeed, if M is another
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language stronger than K, which expresses the R-satisfiability on C, then
the algebras A(L[K]) and A(M [K]) are isomorphic: their elements can be
thought as classes of models obtained from definable in K subclasses of C
via Boolean operations and R−1. Thus we have
Proposition 21. If languages L and M express the R-satisfiability on C
and are stronger than K, then:
1. the algebras A(L[K]) and A(M [K]) are isomorphic, and so
2. MThL[K](C,R) = MThM [K](C,R).
Definition 3 (tentative). If the R-satisfiability on C is expressible in some
language L stronger than K, put MThK(C,R) = MThL[K](C,R).
Trivially, MThL[L](C,R) = MThL(C,R) whenever L expresses the R-
satisfiability on C. Thus this definition generalizes Definition 2. Note that,
however, the modal logic MThK(C,R) is not necessarily a “fragment” of the
theory ThK(C) anymore.
Once we do not require the R-satisfiability to be expressible in the lan-
guage, we can give an “external” definition of modal theory and modal al-
gebra for C, R, and K. Let K✸ be the set of modal K-sentences, which are
built from sentences of K using Boolean connectives and ✸; namely, they are
expressions of form ϕ(ψ1, . . . , ψn) where ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) is a modal formula
and ψi are sentences of K. Such languages are regularly used in the context
of modal logics of relations between models of arithmetic or set theory.4
Given C and R, the K✸-satisfaction relation is defined in the straightfor-
ward way; in particular, A  ✸ϕ(ψ1, . . . , ψk) iff B  ϕ(ψ1, . . . , ψk) for some
B ∈ C with ARB. Assume that R and C satisfy the following natural
condition: for all A,A′,B in C,
A ≃ A′ & ARB ⇒ ∃B′ ∈ C (B′ ≃ B & A′RB′) (3)
(this condition says that the isomorphism equivalence ≃ is a bisimulation
w.r.t. R on C). In this case the K✸-satisfaction relation is preserved under
isomorphisms, and so K✸ satisfies our basic assumptions on model-theoretic
languages.
The operation on sentences of K✸ that takes ϕ to ✸ϕ expresses the R-
satisfiability on C in K✸. Hence, we can apply the constructions described
in Section 2 to K✸ . In particular, ϕ ≈ ψ implies ✸ϕ ≈ ✸ψ (recall that
ϕ ≈ ψ means C  ϕ ↔ ψ), so the connective ✸ induces the operation ✸≈
on K✸/≈, and A(K✸) = (K✸/≈,✸≈) is a modal algebra. It is immediate
that A(K✸) = A(K✸[K]), and hence
MThK(C,R) = MThK✸(C,R)
4In [16], the language K✸ is called partial potentialist.
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by Definition 3. Therefore, assuming that C and R satisfy (3), we obtain
the following generalization of our previous definitions for arbitrary K:
Definition 4. Let C and R satisfy (3). The modal (Lindenbaum) algebra
of a language K on (C,R) is the modal algebra (K✸/≈,✸≈). The modal
theory MThK(C,R) of (C,R) in K is the modal logic of this algebra.
Let us emphasize that natural classes of models with relations between
them always satisfy (3); in particular, so are the instances discussed in
our paper. One might say that R is a model theoretic relation on C iff
property (3) holds. E.g., the submodel relation on the class of models of
a given signature is model-theoretic; hence, Theorem 20 remains true for
arbitrary model-theoretic language.
Downward Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem Our next result provides
a version of the downward Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem for first-order lan-
guage enriched with the modal operator for the extension relation between
models.
For a cardinal κ, put C≤κ = {A ∈ C : |A| ≤ κ}.
Theorem 22. Let K be Lω,ω based on a signature Ω, let K✸ be K enriched
with the modal operator for the extension relation on models ⊑, and let C be
an elementary (in K) class of models. For every κ ≥ ω + |Ω|, the following
statements hold:
1. Let X be a set of elements of A ∈ C, and let λ be a cardinal such that
|X| + κ ≤ λ ≤ |A|. Then A has a submodel B of cardinality λ such
that ThK✸(A) = ThK✸(B) and B contains X.
2. {ThK✸(A) : A ∈ C} = {ThK✸(A) : A ∈ C≤κ}.
3. The modal algebras of K on (C,⊑) and on (C≤κ,⊑) coincide.
4. MThK(C,⊑) = MThK(C≤κ,⊑).
First, we provide a general observation about any C and R satisfying the
condition (3), and arbitraryK. Let ≡ be theK-equivalence on C, and let ≡✸
be theK✸-equivalence on C. Hence, A ≡ B means that Th
K(A) = ThK(B),
and A ≡✸ B that Th
K✸(A) = ThK✸(B). We recall that ThK✸(A) depends
not only on A but also on C and R.
Proposition 23. Assume that C and R satisfy (3). Let ≡ be a bisimulation
w.r.t. R on C, i.e., for all A,A′,B ∈ C we have
A ≡ A′ & ARB ⇒ ∃B′ ∈ C (B′ ≡ B & A′RB′). (4)
Then ≡ and ≡✸ coincide on C.
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Proof. By the standard bisimulation argument: an easy induction on the
construction of ψ(p1, . . . , pn) shows that, whenever A ≡ A
′ and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈
Ks then we have A  ψ(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) ⇔ A
′
 ψ(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn).
Proposition 24. Let K = Lω,ω. If C is an elementary class, then ≡ is
a bisimulation w.r.t. ⊑ on C.
Proof. Pick A,A′,B in C. If A ≡ A′, then there exists an ultrafilter D such
that the ultrapowers AD and A
′
D are isomorphic, due to the Keisler–Shelah
isomorphism theorem (see, e.g., [10, Theorem 6.1.15]). If A ⊑ B, then AD is
embeddable in BD, the ultrapower of B. Since A
′ is embeddable in A′D, we
obtain that A′ is embeddable in BD, and thus A
′ ⊑ B′ for some B′ ≃ BD.
But then we have B′ ∈ C and B′ ≡ B, which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 22. By Propositions 23 and 24, ≡ and ≡✸ coincide on C,
i.e., for all A′,A in C we have:
A′ and A are K-equivalent ⇔ A′ and A are K✸-equivalent. (5)
Now the first statement of the theorem follows from the downward
Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem for the first-order case: A has an elementary
submodelB of cardinality λ such that B contains X (see, e.g., [10, Theorem
3.1.6]); hence A ≡✸ B by (5).
Let (T ,⊑T ,A) and (T
(κ),⊑
(κ)
T ,A
(κ)) be the minimal frames of theories
for C, ⊑, K✸ and for C≤κ, ⊑, K✸, respectively. Let us show that these two
structures are equal.
We have T = T (κ), the second statement of the theorem, as an immediate
corollary of the first one.
Suppose that T1 ⊑T T2, that is, T1 = Th
K✸(A) and T2 = Th
K✸(B) for
some A,B ∈ C with A ⊑ B. Then A has a submodel A′ of cardinality ≤ κ
with A′ ≡✸ A (indeed, if the cardinality of A is less than κ then we put
A′ = A, otherwise we use the first statement of the theorem). Likewise, B
has a submodel B′ of cardinality ≤ κ such that B′ ≡✸ B and B
′ contains
the universe of A′. Clearly, A′ is submodel of B′. It follows that T1 ⊑
(κ)
T T2.
Hence ⊑(κ) includes ⊑. The converse inclusion is obvious, so ⊑(κ) equals ⊑.
Let ϕ ∈ K✸. Since T = T
(κ), it is immediate that {T ∈ T : ϕ ∈ T} =
{T ∈ T (κ) : ϕ ∈ T}. Hence, A(κ) = A.
Thus (T ,⊑T ,A) = (T
(κ),⊑
(κ)
T ,A
(κ)). Now the third and consequently,
the forth, statements are immediate from Definition 4 and Theorem 5.
This result is based on the interplay between the downward Lo¨wenheim–
Skolem property of first-order language and the fact that ≡ is a bisimulation
w.r.t. ⊑. The property of ≡ being a bisimulation w.r.t. a given R seems
interesting enough per se. Contrary to the case of the relation ⊑ (Proposition
24), we have:
17
Proposition 25. Let Ω contain a predicate symbol of arity ≥ 2. Then the
(usual) elementary equivalence is not a bisimulation w.r.t. ⊒ on the class of
models of Ω.
Proof. Assume w.l.g. Ω contains a single binary predicate symbol ≤, and
let ≡ denote ≡Lω,ω . Let A,A
′,B be the linearly ordered sets Q · Z, Z, Q,
respectively (where · denotes the lexicographical multiplication). We have
A ≡ A′ (this fact can be established by using an Eurenfeucht–Fra¨ısse´ game,
see, e.g., [23, Proposition 2.4.10]) and B is embeddable in A. However,
every B′ satisfying B′ ≡ B is a dense linearly ordered set without end-
points. Clearly, no such B′ can at the same time be embeddable in A′.
Let us say that R is image-closed under ultraproducts iff for every A,
(Bi)i∈I , and ultrafilter D over I, if ARBi for all i ∈ I then AR
∏
DBi
(e.g., ARB may mean that, up to isomorphism, B is an extension of A).
Proposition 26. Let C and R satisfy (3), let R be image-closed under
ultraproducts on C, and let K = Lω,ω. If ≡ and ≡✸ coincide on C, then ≡
is a bisimulation w.r.t. R on C.
Proof. Let A,A′,B in C be such that A ≡ A′ and ARB. Observe that for
all ϕ ∈ Ks we have:
B  ϕ ⇒ A  ✸ϕ
⇒ A′  ✸ϕ (since A ≡✸ A
′ )
⇒ A′RBϕ & Bϕ  ϕ for some Bϕ ∈ C.
Let T = ThK(B). For any Γ ∈ Pω(T ) choose a model BΓ in C as in
the observation above, i.e., such that A′RBΓ and BΓ 
∧
Γ . Pick any
ultrafilter D extending the centered family of sets Sϕ = {Γ ∈ Pω(T ) : ϕ ∈
Γ} for all ϕ ∈ T (i.e., a fine ultrafilter over Pω(T )). Then the ultraproduct
B′ =
∏
DBΓ satisfies all ϕ ∈ T , thus B
′
 T . Moreover, since R is image-
closed under ultraproducts, we have A′RB′. This completes the proof.
Remark 5. It suffices to assume that R is image-closed under ultraproducts
by ultrafilters over |K| only. The proposition remains true for K = Lκ,λ
with any strongly compact κ.
5 Robustness and Kripke completeness
The logics of submodels calculated in Section 3 do not depend on choosing
particular language (Theorem 20). However, in general, modal theories
depend on L.
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Example 2. Let L be the first-order language Lω,ω, T the theory of dense
linear orders without end-points. Trivially, the ⊒-satisfiability is expressible
on C = Mod(T ) in L: put f(ϕ) = ϕ. ThenMThL(C,⊒) contains the “trivial”
formula p↔ ✸p. Obviously, this formula is falsified if L is second-order.
Henceforth we assume that C and R satisfy (3).
Proposition 27. Let L and K be two languages. Then L ⊆ K implies
MThL(C,R) ⊇ MThK(C,R).
Proof. Follows from Definition 4, since on (C,R), the modal algebra of L is
a subalgebra of the algebra of K.
One can think that L describes the properties of (C,R) in a robust
way whenever the modal theory does not change under strengthening the
language. Thus, we shall say that MThL(C,R) is robust iff for every language
K ⊇ L we have
MThK(C,R) = MThL(C,R).
Intuitively, the robust theory can be considered as a “true” modal logic of
the model-theoretic relation R on C.
By Definition 4 and Theorem 6, modal theories are logics of general
frames. The following construction shows that, under certain assumptions,
robust theories are logics of Kripke frames (i.e., they are Kripke complete).
A relation S is said to be image-set iff for every A the image S(A) = {B :
ASB} is a set; S is image-set on C iff its restriction to C is image-set. Recall
that A ≃ B means that A and B are isomorphic, and that [A]≃R≃[B]≃
iff ∃A′ ≃ A∃B′ ≃ B (A′RB′). Let C≃ abbreviate C/≃. Also, recall that
R∗(A) denotes
⋃
n<ωR
n(A), the least R-closed D ⊆ C containing A.
Proposition 28. If R≃ is image-set on C≃, then
MThL(C,R) ⊇
⋂
A∈C
MLog(R∗(A)≃,R≃).
Proof. Let A ∈ C. The inclusion MThL(R∗(A),R) ⊇ MLog(R∗(A)≃,R≃)
follows from (2) at the end of Section 2. Now we apply Corollary 4.
Theorem 29. If R≃ is image-set on C≃, then
MThL(C,R) is robust iff MThL(C,R) =
⋂
A∈C
MLog(R∗(A)≃,R≃).
Proof. (⇒) Put Λ = MThL(C,R). In view of Proposition 28, we only have
to show that Λ is valid in the Kripke frame (R∗(A)≃,R≃) for every A ∈ C.
Fix A ∈ C and put Y = R∗(A). For a language M , let (T M,RT M ,A
M )
be the minimal frame of its theories in the class Y .
Since R≃ is image-set on C≃, the quotient Y≃ is a set. Hence we can
choose a language K stronger than L and such that the K-equivalence and
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the isomorphism relation coincide on Y . Observe that for every M stronger
than K, the Kripke frames (T M,RTM ), (T
K,RT K ), and (Y≃,R≃) are iso-
morphic. We choose such M that
∀T ∈ T K ∃ϕT ∈Ms ∀A ∈ Y
(
A  ϕT ⇔ Th
K(A) = T
)
, and moreover
∀S ⊆ T K ∃ϕS ∈Ms ∀A ∈ Y
(
A  ϕS ⇔ Th
K(A) ∈ S
)
.
It follows that AM is P(T M ), the powerset of T M , and so (T M,RT M ,A
M )
is a Kripke frame. By Theorem 6, MThM (Y,R) is the logic of this frame.
Therefore, MThM (Y,R) is the logic of the Kripke frame (Y≃,R≃). Since
Λ is robust, we have Λ = MThM (C,R). By Corollary 4, Λ ⊆ MThM (Y,R).
(⇐) Immediate from Propositions 27 and 28.
Hence, when R≃ is image-set on C≃, this theorem describes a unique
modal logic, the robust theory of (C,R).
Remark 6. More generally, if K is a class of model-theoretic languages,
a modal theory MThL(C,R) is robust in K iff it coincides with MThK(C,R)
for every language K ⊇ L in K. It is easy to see that there exists at
most one robust theory of (C,R) whenever K is directed, and exactly one
such theory whenever K is countably directed, in the sense that for every
{Kn ∈ K : n ∈ ω} there is K ∈ K which is stronger than any Kn.
Notice that even if C is a set, Theorem 29 does not mean that the robust
theory of (C,R) is the logic of the Kripke frame (C,R).
Example 3. Let A be the algebra (2<ω, inf, l, r) with the binary operation
inf(x, y) = x ∩ y and the unary operations l(x) = xa0, r(x) = xa1, where
a denotes the concatenation. It is easy to see that (Sub(A),⊒), the structure
of submodels of A, is isomorphic to the binary tree T2 = (2
<ω,⊆). The
modal logic of the Kripke frame T2 is known to be S4 (see [13]). However,
for every L, the modal theory MThL(Sub(A),⊒) is the trivial logic given by
the axiom p↔ ✸p because every submodel of A is isomorphic to A.
More completeness results We apply Theorem 29 to describe robust
theories of the quotient and the submodel relations on certain natural
classes.
The following fact most probably was known since 1970s.
Proposition 30 (V. B. Shehtman, private communication). The logic of
the Kripke frame (P(ω),⊆) is S4.2.1.
Proof (sketch). It is not difficult to construct a family V ⊂ P(ω) such that
V is downward-closed (i.e., U1 ⊆ U2 ∈ V implies U1 ∈ V) and there exists
a p-morphism of (V,⊆) onto the binary tree T2 = (2
<ω,⊆). (E.g., let
f be a bijection ω → 2<ω, and let V consist of U ⊂ ω such that f(U) is
a finite chain in T2; the required p-morphism takes U to the greatest element
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of this chain.) This p-morphism obviously extends to the p-morphism of
(P(ω),⊆) onto T′2, the ordered sum of T2 and a reflexive singleton. Since
MLog(T′2) = S4.2.1 (see [29]), it follows that MLog(P(ω),⊆) is included in
S4.2.1. The converse inclusion is clear.
Theorem 31. Let Ω contain a functional symbol and a constant symbol,
and let C be the class of all models of Ω. Then the robust theory of (C,⊒) is
S4.2.1.
Proof. Soundness is straightforward. Let us check the converse inclusion.
Let a signature Ω0 consist of a single unary functional symbol F ; models
of this signature are called unars. For any n ∈ ω\{0}, let An be a cycle of
length n, i.e., a one-generated unar of cardinality n that satisfies Fn(x) = x.
As easy to see, each An has no proper submodels.
Let also A be the disjoint sum of all these An. Clearly, A is a countably
generated unar, and any its submodel is given by a nonempty set S ⊆ ω,
and the map taking S to the disjoint sum of An for all n ∈ S is an isomor-
phism between (P(ω)\{∅},⊇) and the frame (Sub(A),⊒) of submodels of A.
Moreover, all submodels of A are pairwise non-isomorphic, and hence, the
Kripke frame (Sub(A)≃,⊒≃) is also isomorphic to (P(ω)\{∅},⊇).
Without loss of generality we may assume that F is the only functional
symbol in Ω (we can always mimic a unary functional symbol by any func-
tional symbol of arity ≥ 1). Expanding Ω0 to Ω, let A
′ be the model of Ω ob-
tained from A by adding a single extra point a which interprets all constant
symbols and assuming F (a) = a. Then the Kripke frame (Sub(A′)≃,⊒≃) is
isomorphic to (P(ω),⊇).
By Theorem 29, the robust theory of (C,⊒) is included in the logic
MLog(P(ω),⊇), which is S4.2.1 by Proposition 30.
Remark 7. It follows from the above proof that for the class C of unars
without constant symbols, the robust theory of (C,⊒) is included in the in-
tersection of the logics of Skvortsov frames (P(κ)\{∅},⊇) for all κ. However,
it is unclear how the “soundness” part of the proof can be obtained. This
question is connected to a long-standing open problem about properties of
the modal Medvedev logic, see, e.g., [30].
Remark 8. The proof of Theorem 31 is much simpler than the proof of The-
orem 20, and covers more signatures in the case with constants. However,
it is unclear whether the completeness result holds for second- or first-order
language. In other words, we do not know whether the resulting theories
are robust in the case of second- or first-order language.
LetB ≤ A mean that B is a quotient of A (for the definition of quotients
of arbitrary models, see [22, Section 2.4]), and Quot(A) = {B : B ≤ A}.
Quotients are, up to isomorphism, images under strong homomorphisms,
hence the logic of quotients is the same that the logic of strong homomorphic
images.
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Theorem 32. Let Ω have a functional symbol of arity ≥ 1, and C the class
of all models of Ω. Then the robust theory of (C,≥) is S4.2.1.
Proof. Soundness is straightforward. In particular, every model A has
a unique single-point quotient B, and for any valuation ‖·‖ in L we have:
A  ‖✷✸p‖ iff B  ‖✸p‖ iff B  ‖✷p‖ iff A  ‖✸✷p‖.
By Theorem 29, the robust theory of (C,≥) is included in the logic
(Quot(A)≃,≥≃) for any model A of Ω. We shall construct A such that
MLog(Quot(A)≃,≥≃) ⊆ S4.2.1. It suffices to handle the case when Ω con-
sists of a single unary functional symbol F . As in Theorem 31, let An be
a one-generated unar forming the cycle of length n. It is easy to see that all
quotients of An are (up to isomorphism) exactly Am for n divisible by m; in
particular, if p is prime, Quot(Ap) is {A1,Ap}.
Let A be the disjoint sum of the unars Ap for p = 1 or p prime. Let P
denote the set of primes. Up to isomorphism, every quotient B of A is the
disjoint sum of unars {Ap : p ∈ S} and also n copies of A1 for some S ⊆ P
and n ≤ 1 + |P\S|; we put h(B) = h([B]≃]) = S and g(B) = n. We claim
that h is a p-morphism of (Quot(A)≃,≥≃) onto (P(P ),⊇). Surjectivity and
monotonicity are straightforward. Assume that h([B]≃) = S and pick any
S′ ⊆ S. Let B′ be the disjoint sum of unars {Ap : p ∈ S
′} and g(B) copies
of A1. Then B
′ is isomorphic to a quotient of B, and h([B′]≃) = S
′, as
required.
It follows that MLog(Quot(A)≃,≥≃) is included in MLog(P(P ),⊇). By
Proposition 30, the latter logic is S4.2.1, which completes the proof.
Remark 9. This theorem remains true for (not necessarily strong) homo-
morphic images as well. That S4.2.1 includes the modal theory of homo-
morphisms follows from the proof above (the signature of A does not have
predicate symbols). And S4.2.1 is sound since C has a single-point model
that gives a top element in C/≃ .
Remark 10. Similarly to the case of the submodel relation, the quotient
relation is expressible in an appropriate second-order language. Given Ω
and λ > |{F ∈ Ω : F is a functional symbol}|, for every ϕ of L2λ,ω in Ω we
pick a fresh binary predicate variable U and define ϕU by induction on ϕ:
if t0, . . . , tn−1 are terms in Ω and P (t0, . . . , tn−1) is an atomic formula, then
P (t0, . . . , tn−1)U is ∃x0 . . . ∃xn−1
(∧
i<n U(xi, ti) ∧ P (x0, . . . , xn−1)
)
where xi are fresh first-order variables; if F is a functional variable, then
(∃F ϕ)U is ∃F (U is a congruence for F ∧ ϕU );
we let the operation distribute w.r.t. Boolean connectives and quantifiers
over first-order and predicate variables (e.g., (∃P ϕ
)
U
is ∃P ϕU for every
predicate variable P ). If χ(U) says that the interpretation of U is a con-
gruence for interpretations of all functional symbols in Ω, then the map
ϕ 7→ ∃U(χ(U) ∧ ϕU ) expresses the ≥-satisfiability on Ω-models.
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However, in second-order language, we do not know whether the modal
theory of quotients is S4.2.1.
So far we have calculated modal theories only for classes consisting of all
models of a given signature. In the following examples, we describe robust
modal theories of classes consisting of models of a non-trivial theory; we
only outline ideas and postpone complete proofs for a further paper.
Example 4. Let D be the class of dense linearly ordered sets without end-
points. It was observed in Example 2 that the modal theory MThLω,ω(D,⊒)
is trivial: this is the logic of a reflexive singleton axiomatized by the formula
p↔ ✸p. On the other hand, the robust theory of (D,⊒) is S4.2.1.
By the classical Cantor theorem, every two countable orders in D are
isomorphic (see, e.g., [24, Theorem 2.8]). Therefore, (D≃,⊒≃) has a top
element (the order type of rationals), so its logic includes S4.2.1 (in spite of
the fact that we do not have constant symbols in the signature). To prove
the converse inclusion, in view of Corollary 4, it suffices to show that S4.2.1
includes the logic of a generated subframe of the frame (D≃,⊒≃).
Given S ⊆ R, let DS = {[X]≃ : X ⊆ S is dense in R}. (Note that
[X]≃ is the order type of X.) First we observe that, whenever S ⊆ R is
dense, then (DS ,⊒≃) forms an upper cone of (D≃,⊒≃). Hence it suffices
to find S such that the logic of (DS ,⊒≃) coincides with S4.2.1. For this,
we use the following result by Sierpin´ski: there are two disjoint sets E,F
of reals both dense in R, having cardinality |E| = |F | = 2ℵ0 , and such that
f(E) 6⊆ E ∪ F for any non-identity order embedding f : R → R (see, e.g.,
[24, Chapter 9, § 2]). Let S = E ∪ F , and for any dense subset X of S, let
pi([X]≃) = A if X = E ∪ A for some A ⊆ F , and pi([X]≃) = ∅ otherwise.
It can be verified that pi is a well-defined map and moreover, a p-morphism
of (DS ,⊒≃) onto (P(F ),⊇). It induces a p-morphism of (DS ,⊒≃) onto
(P(ω),⊇). Applying Proposition 30, we conclude that MLog(DS ,⊒≃) is
S4.2.1, as required.
Let L and O be the classes of linearly ordered sets and partially ordered
sets, respectively. The robust theories of (L,⊒) and (O,⊒) also coincide
with S4.2.1. To see this, we note that there exists a p-morphism of (L,⊒)
onto (D,⊒) (condensing scattered segments, see, e.g., [24, Chapter 4]) and
that (L,⊒) is an upper cone of (O,⊒). This induces the same relationships
between (D≃ ⊒≃), (L≃,⊒≃), and (O≃,⊒≃).
Example 5. Let C be the class of modal algebras. Similarly to the proof of
Theorem 31, one can show that the robust theory of (C,≥) is S4.2.1. Namely,
let F be the disjoint sum of Kripke frames Fn = (n, n × n), and A be the
modal algebra of F. One can construct a p-morphism from (Quot(A)≃,≥≃)
onto (P(ω),⊇). Thus, S4.2.1 is the robust theory of the quotient relation on
the class C of modal algebras. We have the same axiomatization in the case
when C is the class of S4-algebras or S5-algebras, because A is an S5-algebra.
(More generally, this holds if C contains A and is closed under quotients.)
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The axiomatization in the case when C is the class of Boolean algebras
is an open question.
Example 6. Let C be the class of free groups. Let Fκ be a κ-generated
free group. All Fκ with 2 ≤ κ ≤ ℵ0 are pairwise embeddable and non-
isomorphic, while on all other Fκ their ordering by embedding coincides
with their ordering by rank (the least cardinality of generators). Therefore,
the Kripke frame (C≃,⊒≃) has the top (corresponding to F1), a countable
cluster immediate below the top (corresponding to Fκ’s with 2 ≤ κ ≤ ℵ0),
and a structure isomorphic to (Ord,≥) (corresponding to Fκ’s with κ ≥ ℵ1).
By Theorem 29, it follows that the robust theory of (C,⊒) is the modal logic
of ordered sums (α,≥) + S + S0 for α ∈ Ord, a countable cluster S, and a
singleton S0. By the standard filtration technique, this logic has the finite
model property (more precisely, we may assume that α and S are finite) and
decidable.
The class C is closed under ⊒ as any subgroup of a free group is free
by the classical Nielsen–Schreier theorem. Hence, ⊒-satisfiability on C is
expressible in L2ω,ω by Proposition 9. We do not know whether the modal
theory of ⊒ on C in L2ω,ω is robust.
We remark that in the first-order case the theory is not robust. Let ≡
be the usual elementary equivalence. Observe that F1 ≃ Z 6≡ F2 (obvious),
and Fκ ≡ F2 for all κ ≥ 2 (by recently proved famous Tarski’s conjecture;
see, e.g., [12, Chapter 9]). It follows that (C≡,⊒≡) is isomorphic to the
ordinal 2 (with the top corresponding to F1 and the bottom to other free
groups). Moreover, the logic MThLω,ω(C,⊒) is the logic of the ordinal 2.
This follows from Corollary 7 in view of the following observation made by
one the reviewers on an earlier version of the paper: the function f : Ls → Ls
defined by letting
f(ϕ) =


⊤ if F1  ϕ,
ϕ if F1 6 ϕ but F2  ϕ,
⊥ otherwise
expresses the ⊒-satisfiability on C. This observation can be generalized as
follows: if the elementary equivalence ≡ is a bisimulation w.r.t. R on C and
C≡ is finite, then the R-satisfiability on C is first-order expressible.
Even in the case of all models of a given signature, the axiomatization
of the robust theory can be a very difficult problem. Consider the theories
of the relation ⊒ on the class C of all models of a signature Ω consisting of
unary predicates and perhaps some constants.
The easiest is the degenerated case when Ω has no symbols other than
constants. The theory of submodels on this class is Grz.3, the Grzegorczyk
logic with the linearity axiom. As well-known, this is the logic of conversely
well-ordered sets, or of the set ω with the converse order, or else of all finite
linearly ordered sets.
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Furthermore, these theories include the logic Grz iff Ω contains finitely
many predicates. We announce that in the case of n < ω predicates, the
robust modal theory coincides with the modal logic of the direct product of
2n copies of ω with the converse order if the signature has constants, and
with the logic of this structure without the top element otherwise. These
logics have the finite model property, decrease as n grows, and their in-
tersection coincides with MLog(Pω(ω)\{∅},⊇), the modal Medvedev logic.
Despite this clear semantical description, no complete axiomatizations for
these logics are known.
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